missouri v jenkins case brief 1990

19 (W.D.Mo. The list of legislative powers in Article I, 8, cl. 377 Fed. Jenkins Case Brief Case Name: Missouri v. Jenkins Case Citation: 491 U.S. 274 (1989) FACTS: Plaintiff sues Defendants claiming racial segregation. 2101(c) requires that a petition for certiorari in a civil case be filed within 90 days after the entry of the judgment sought to be reviewed. Later, on remand in 1993, the district court ordered the state to pay for salary increases for teaching and non-teaching personnel. The difference between the two approaches is far more than a matter of form. . The District Court was candid to acknowledge that the "long term goal of this Court's remedial order is to make available to all KCMSD students educational opportunities equal to or greater than those presently available in the average Kansas City, Missouri metropolitan suburban school district." Wayne United Gas Co. v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., The Third Circuit, while leaving open the possibility that in some situation a court-ordered tax might be appropriate, has also declined to approve judicial interference in taxation. U.S. 358, 368 Don't Miss Important Points of Law with BARBRI Outlines (Login Required). They insist that the Eighth Circuit cannot, post hoc, amend its order to make it appear that it took an action which it never took. Id., at 38-39. According to the Clerk, the 90-day period in which Jackson County could petition for certiorari began to run on August 19, 1988, and expired on November 17, 1988. The Eighth Circuit surely knows of Education v. Brinkman, U.S. 274 Cf. [495 -386 (1908). p. 58. 495 U. S. 50-52. Brown v. Board of Education, The very cases cited by the majority show that a federal court has no such authority. operates to suspend the finality of the . On appeal, the Court of Appeals rejected the State's argument that a federal court lacks judicial power to order a tax increase. Bi-Metallic Co. v. Colorado State Bd. James Madison observed: "Justice is the end of government. U.S. 265, 280 [495 855 F.2d, at 1313. (1881); United States v. New Orleans, Had it regarded the State's papers as only a suggestion for rehearing in banc, without a petition for rehearing, it would have, as required by Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 35(c) and 41(a), issued its mandate within 21 days of the entry of the panel's judgment or would have, under Rule 41(a), issued an order extending the time for the issuance of the mandate. at 411. . [495 U.S. 203, 205 282 The Court cites a single case, Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 4 Wall. 1961) (A. Hamilton). Cf. [495 ." 1987). U.S. 1, 42 The Court states that the KCMSD was "invested with authority to collect and disburse the property tax." The order approving salary increases, which was grounded in improving the "desegregative attractiveness" of the KCMSD, likewise exceeded the District Court's admittedly broad discretion. denied, Citation 495 US 33 (1990) Argued. Proc. While the court below, unlike other Courts of Appeals, does not have a published practice of treating all suggestions for rehearing in banc as containing both petitions for rehearing and suggestions for rehearing in banc, this Court will not assume that the court's action in this case is not in accord with its regular practice. This puts the conclusion before the premise. Jenkins v. Missouri, 495 U.S. 33, 50-58 (1990). [ U.S. 170 There is no showing in this record that, faced with the revenue shortfall, the District Court gave due consideration to the possibility that another remedy among the "wide range of possibilities" would have addressed the constitutional violations without giving rise to a funding crisis. Missouri v. Jenkins Case Brief | Kathyrine M. Finch KCMSD was also directed to issue $150 U.S. 1015 similarly styled petitions by other parties seeking to intervene and issued its mandate. After a lengthy trial, the District Court found that KCMSD and the State had operated a segregated school system within the KCMSD. In the present case, KCMSD was ready, willing, and, but for the operation of state law, able to remedy the deprivation of constitutional rights itself. Can a court create a segregation remedial plan which has a goal of attracting nonminority students into the district? Cf. Today's casual embrace of taxation imposed by the unelected, life-tenured Federal Judiciary disregards Title 28 U.S.C. U.S. 218 1. 78, p. 523 (J. Cooke ed. 855 F.2d, at 1314. The Missouri Constitution states that "[p]roperty taxes and other local taxes . Rev. 443 [495 (1989). Petitioner then challenged the courts authority to impose taxes under U.S. Const. 1983. A federal courts power to remediate school segregation is bounded by the nature and scope of the initial constitutional violation. Absent a change in state law, the tax is imposed by federal authority under a federal decree. As a segregation remedial order, a federal court ordered Missouri (Defendant) to fund raises for teachers and staff in the Kansas City Metropolitan School District and to fund magnet programs. 298 of Education, The District Court next considered, as the Court of Appeals had directed, how to shift the cost of desegregation to KCMSD. (1989); Reynolds v. Sims, 215 [495 But the Court does not heed Von Hoffman's holding. 403 (1879), held that mandamus would not lie to force a local government to levy taxes in excess of the limits contained in a statute in effect at the time the county incurred its bonded indebtedness, for the explicit limitation on the taxing power became part of the contract, the bondholders had notice of the limitation and were deemed to have consented to it, and hence no contractual remedy was unconstitutionally impaired by observing [BAD TEXT] he statute. App. It is true that the Eighth Circuit's original October 14 order stated that there were three "petitions for rehearing en banc pending before the Court" and that all "petitions for rehearing en banc" were denied. United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Citation 491 US 274 (1989) Argued Feb 21, 1989 Decided Jun 19, 1989 Advocates Bruce Farmer Assistant Attorney General of Missouri, argued the cause for the petitioners Jay Topkis argued the cause for the respondents Facts of the case The district court stated that it would "not Though the matter is not without difficulty, we conclude that the State has the better of the argument. 377 (1984); United States v. Missouri, 515 F.2d 1365 (in banc), cert. U.S. 803, 818 421 (WD Mo. Supp., at 53-55. During the 15 years that followed the Supreme Court's momentous school desegregation decision in br, Missouri Tech: Distance Learning Programs, Missouri State University: Narrative Description, Missouri State University: Distance Learning Programs, Missouri Southern State University: Tabular Data, Missouri Southern State University: Narrative Description, Missouri Southern State University: Distance Learning Programs, Missouri Pacific Railroad v. Humes 115 U.S. 512 (1885), Missouri Ex Rel. But the Court of Appeals' entire discussion of "a preferable method for future funding," ibid., can be considered no more than dictum, the court itself having already upheld the District Court's actions to date. Id., at 145a-146a (emphasis in original). Rather, the cases show that where a limitation on the local authority's taxing power is not a subsequent enactment itself in violation of the Contracts Clause, a federal court is without power to order a tax levy that goes beyond the authority granted by state law. Footnote 5 U.S. 622, 625 The Sixth Circuit, in a somewhat different context, has recognized the severe intrusion caused by federal court interference in state and local financing. (1942), it has been the consistent practice of the Court to treat petitions for rehearing timely presented to the Courts of Appeals as tolling the start of the period in which a petition for certiorari must be sought until rehearing is denied or a new judgment is entered on the rehearing. U.S. 33, 78]. The Clerk informed Jackson County that although the timely filing of a "petition for rehearing" with the Court of Appeals tolls the running of the 90-day period, the filing of a "petition for rehearing en banc" does not toll the time. Missouri Law Review Washington v. Washington Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Assn., Supp., at 28, 31-33. Before taking such a drastic step the District Court was obliged to assure itself that no permissible alternative would have accomplished the required task. Id., at 76a. The courts held that the state of Missouri was liable for segregated schools within the boundaries of KCMSD. See n. 13, supra. This is true as well of the problems of financing desegregation, for no matter has been more consistently placed upon the shoulders of local government than that of financing public schools. The District Court thereafter issued an order detailing the remedies necessary to eliminate the vestiges of segregation and the financing necessary to implement those remedies. place in the KCMSD without a federal court order. With all respect, it is this third group of cases that applies. U.S., at 291 153a. "Proposition C" allocates one cent of every dollar raised by the state sales tax to a schools trust fund and requires school districts to reduce property taxes by an amount equal to 50% of the previous year's sales tax receipts in the district. [495 Ibid. 535 (1867); Board of Commissioners of Knox County v. Aspinwall, 24 How. The Kansas City Desegregation Case. It is accepted by all the parties, as it was by the courts below, that the imposition of a tax increase by a federal court was an extraordinary event. The State's certiorari petition was timely filed. 74 MISSOURI v. JENKINS Opinion of the Court I A general overview of this litigation is necessary for proper resolution of the issues upon which we granted cer-tiorari. Few ends are more important than enforcing the guarantee of equal educational opportunity for our Nation's children. The plan involved a variation of the magnet school concept. to Pet. U.S. 33, 37]. Other Circuits routinely treat documents so labeled 1988. 18 We cannot create new A district court may not create an intra-district segregation remedial plan with the purpose of attracting nonminority students into the district. 788 S.W.2d 536 (1990) Robert D. JENKINS, Movant-Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent. denied sub nom. As the Reporter for the Advisory Committee drafting the Rules has observed: "[A] party who desires a hearing or rehearing in banc may `suggest' the appropriateness of such a hearing. Supp., at 45. 2101(c) - which requires that a civil certiorari petition be filed within 90 days after the entry of the judgment below and that any application for an extension of time be filed within the original 90-day period - since, while the filing of a "petition for rehearing" under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 40 tolls the running of the 90-day period, the filing of a "suggestion for rehearing in banc" under Rule 35 does not. 70, 98 L.Ed.2d 34 (1987). Turning to the property tax increase, the Court of Appeals rejected the State's argument that a federal court lacks the judicial power to order a tax increase. A year later, the District Court approved KCMSD's proposal to operate six magnet schools during the 1986-1987 school year. U.S. 472, 501 visual attractiveness sought by the Court as it would result in floor coverings with unsightly sections of mismatched carpeting and tile, and individual walls possessing different shades of paint." The Court of Appeals' modifications of the District Court's order satisfy equitable and constitutional principles governing the District Court's power. United States v. Missouri, 515 F.2d 1365, 1372-1373 (1975) (District Court may "implement its desegregation order by directing that provision be made for the levying of taxes"); Liddell v. Missouri, 731 F.2d 1294, 1320, cert. Oral Argument - January 11, 1995. they are not unlimited," Whitcomb v. Chavis, public school system suggests that `there will be more than one constitutionally permissible method of solving them,' and that . rehearing in banc, unlike a petition for rehearing, "shall not affect the finality of the judgment of the court of appeals or stay the issuance of the mandate.". The Court of Appeals' judgment was entered on August 19, 1988. These cases hold that where there is no state or municipal taxation authority that the federal court may by mandamus command the officials to exercise, the court is itself without authority to order taxation. In pursuing the demand of justice for racial equality, I fear that the Court today loses sight of other basic political liberties guaranteed by our constitutional system, liberties that can coexist with a proper exercise of judicial remedial powers adequate to correct constitutional violations. The District Court should have made more findings to determine whether the KCMSDs student population was a result of vestiges of past discrimination. 9th Circuit. Missouri v. Jenkins Agyei, No. 88-64 - Federal Cases - vLex 672 F. Supp. It is true that the Court of Appeals went on "to consider the procedures which the district court should use in the future." [495 Id., at 684, 685. Mo. Brief for Petitioners 42. You can opt out at any time by clicking the unsubscribe link in our newsletter, If you have not signed up for your Casebriefs Cloud account Click Here, Thank you for registering as a Pre-Law Student with Casebriefs. Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 F. Respondents argue that accepting the Eighth Circuit's interpretation of its October 14 order in this case risks confusion in future cases and invites the lower courts to pick and choose between those parties whose "petitions for rehearing in banc" they view favorably and wish to give additional time for seeking review in this Court, and those whose petitions they wish to give no such aid. 418 Anything that is predominantly black is not necessarily inferior. H. Bartow Farr . Learn more about FindLaws newsletters, including our terms of use and privacy policy. Apr 18, 1990. The Clerk of this Court returned the application to Jackson County as untimely. Synopsis of Rule of Law. U.S. 1, 5 As we have said, "[t]axation is a legislative function, and Congress . In an action under 42 U.S.C. U.S. 33, 80] Rule App. The scope of the desegregation order was also upheld against all the State's objections, id., at 1301-1307, as was the allocation of costs, id., at 1307-1308. The District Court concluded that it would be "clearly inequitable" to require the population of KCMSD to pay half of the desegregation cost, and that "even with Court help it would be very difficult for the KCMSD to fund more than 25% of the costs of the entire remedial plan." The order here provides neither of these protections. U.S., at 291 [ The term `suggest' was deliberately chosen to make it clear that a party's sole entitlement is to direct the attention of the court to the desirability of in banc consideration. U.S. 33, 64] No cost was placed on the interdistrict transfer program, but the State was ordered to underwrite the program in full. U.S. 33, 49] The historical record of voluntary compliance with the decree of Brown v. Board of Education is not a proud chapter in our constitutional history, and the judges of the District Courts and Courts of Appeals have been courageous and skillful in implementing its mandate. 291 (1987). Const., Art. v. United States, 415 F.2d 817 (CA5 1969). No. Rev. ] The complaint originally alleged that the defendants had caused interdistrict segregation of the public schools. To suggest that a constitutional violation will go unremedied if a district does not, though capital improvements or other means, turn every school into a magnet school, and the entire district into a magnet district, is to suggest that the remedies approved in our past cases should have been disapproved as insufficient to deal with the violations. This exception also has no application to this case, where there are state and local officials invested with authority to collect and disburse the property tax and where, as matters now stand, the District Court need only prevent those officials from applying state law that would interfere with the willing levy of property taxes by KCMSD. App. The purpose of the position was to "solicit community support and involvement" in the District Court's desegregation plan. U.S. 267 No. Rather than exercising what it believed to be its power to order a tax increase to fund the remedy, the court chose to impose other means - including enjoining the effect of one of the state-law provisions - to allow KCMSD to raise additional revenue. It is the end of civil society. 35(a). to Pet. ] The Court of Appeals also relied on Circuit precedent suggesting that a district court could order a property tax increase after exploring every other fiscal alternative. (1879); Heine v. Levee The District Court further ordered the State to fund fully other portions of the desegregation program intended to reduce class size and to improve student achievement. We disagree. This is not an accurate description. A subsequent order directed that the revenues generated by the property tax increase be used to retire the capital improvement bonds. Annual Subscription ($175 / Year). Ferguson Reorganized School Dist. Missouri v. Jenkins - Case Briefs - 1988, Case Briefs - 1989, Case Briefs - 1994 Missouri v. Jenkins PETITIONER:Missouri RESPONDENT:Kalima Jenkins et al. U.S. 248 It is, therefore, unfair to announce a foundational holding regarding Freeman v. Pittswithout giving the parties the chance to fully brief that issue. ] See Tr. [495 281 (1977). But as discussed supra, at 63-65, there was no state authority in this case for the KCMSD to exercise. 55a (correcting order for assessment of penalties for nonpayment that "mistakenly" assessed penalties on an extra tax year); id., at 57a ("clarify[ing]" the inclusion of savings and loan institutions, estates, trusts, and beneficiaries in the court's income tax surcharge and enforcement procedures). As the State puts it, "[t]he only reason that the court below needed to consider an unprecedented tax increase was the equally unprecedented cost of its remedial programs." On September 16, the State filed with the court a document styled "State Appellants' Petition for Rehearing En Banc." As was said in another context, "[t]he very complexity of the problems of financing and managing a . Law School Case Brief Missouri v. Jenkins - 495 U.S. 33, 110 S. Ct. 1651 (1990) Rule: Remedial powers of an equity court must be adequate to the task, but they are not unlimited, and one of the most important considerations governing the exercise of equitable power is a proper respect for the integrity and function of local government institutions. The courts only question must be whether the state is intentionally discriminating against minorities. Local government bodies in Missouri, as elsewhere, must derive their power from a sovereign, and that sovereign is the State of Missouri. 493 U.S. Supreme CourtMissouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990), In an action under 42 U.S.C. There is no allegation here, nor could there be, that the neutral tax limitations imposed by the people of Missouri are unconstitutional. In November 1986, the District Court endorsed a marked expansion of the magnet school program. The fact that a school is predominately black is not an indication of intentional, unconstitutional segregation. [495 U.S. 274, 280 Even on the assumption that a federal court might order taxation in an extreme case, the unique nature of the taxing power would demand that this remedy be used as a last resort. 433 The city defended based on a state statute that limited its power of taxation, and the Circuit Court refused to mandamus the city. [ There the holder of bonds issued by the city sought a writ of mandamus against the city requiring it to levy taxes sufficient to pay interest We granted certiorari, 488 U.S. 888 (1988), to resolve two questions relating to fees litigation under 90 Stat. (1979); Dayton Bd. U.S. 33, 62] 433 papers as only a suggestion for rehearing in banc, without a petition for panel rehearing as well, Rules 35(c) and 41(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure would have required the court to issue its mandate within 21 days of the entry of the panel's judgment. 495 U. S. 55-59. 11. 3 U.S. 816 New York City Bd. 113a. 1985), aff'd as modified, 807 F.2d 657 (8th Cir. (1989). Moreover, the petition for certiorari in this case included the contention that the District Court should not have considered the power to tax before considering whether its choice of remedy was the only possible way to achieve desegregation as a part of its argument on Question 2, which the Court granted. [495 93-1823. U.S. 33, 60] of Education, 491 U.S. at 285. Did the District Court exceed its constitutional authority by ordering salary increases of instructional and non-instructional employees of the KCMSD? U.S. 294, 299 denied, This reflects the Framers' understanding that taxation was not a proper area for judicial involvement. Desegregation of schools involves ending intentional segregation, but does not mean that minority and nonminority students must attend the same schools. [ JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court. You can opt out at any time by clicking the unsubscribe link in our newsletter, Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action (BAMN). (1971), and one of the most important considerations governing the exercise of equitable power is a proper respect for the integrity and function of local government institutions. U.S. 33, 74] No one suggests the KCMSD taxpayers are parties. v. Rodriguez, . See App. App. Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 61 (1990) (Jenkins II) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Finding that construction of new schools would result in more "attractive" facilities than renovation of existing ones, the District Court approved new construction at a cost ranging from $61.80 per square foot to $95.70 per square foot as distinct from renovation at $45 per square foot. WHITE, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court with respect to Parts I and II, and the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts III and IV, in which BRENNAN, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. See United States v. New Orleans, Pp. Board of Education of Oklahoma City Public Schools v. Dowell, List of United States Supreme Court cases, volume 515, List of United States Supreme Court cases, Lists of United States Supreme Court cases by volume, List of United States Supreme Court cases by the Rehnquist Court, "Money And School Performance: Lessons from the Kansas City Desegregation Experiment", "Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274 (1989)", "Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990)". U.S., at 266 But, as we see it, that is not what happened in this case: the Eighth Circuit originally entered an order denying the "petitions for rehearing en banc" because the papers filed with the court were styled as "petitions for rehearing en banc." 431 The judicial taxation approved by the Eighth Circuit is also without parallel. BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which WHITE, BLACKMUN, STEVENS, and KENNEDY, JJ., joined, and in Parts I and III of which O'CONNOR and SCALIA, JJ., joined. often used to encourage voluntary movement of students within the district in a pattern that aids desegregation. Third, the federal courts in devising a remedy must take into account the interests of state and local authorities in managing their own affairs, consistent with the Constitution. for Cert. ] The Court of Appeals "affirm[ed] the actions that the court has taken to this point," but detailed "the procedures which the district court should use in the future." The Court is unanimous in its holding, that the Court of Appeals' judgment affirming "the actions that the [district] court has taken to this point," 855 F.2d 1295, 1314 (CA8 1988), must be reversed. The District Court orders in this case suggest the pitfalls of the first course. Kansas City, Missouri, School Dist. (1879) (reaffirming legislative nature of the taxing power and the availability of mandamus to compel officers to levy a tax where they were required by state law to do so); City of Galena v. Amy, 5 Wall. 374 Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 F. Supp. fact, had the very alternative outlined by the Court of Appeals. U.S., at 293 349 Consequently, Rule 35(c) specifically provides that the filing of a suggestion for The District Court believed that it had the power to order a tax increase to ensure adequate funding of the desegregation plan, but it hesitated to take this step. [ Case Western Reserve Law Review U.S. 33, 70] Footnote 4 of Equalization, judicial power. In that year, the KCMSD, the National Cable Television Assn., Inc. v. United States, (d) The Court of Appeals' order does not exceed the judicial power under Article III. An order of this type would find support in the Griffin dicta and present a closer question than the one before us. Id., at 1316-1317. App. It is not a function the Judiciary as an institution is designed to exercise. 2463, 105 L.Ed.2d 229 The following criteria must be considered in evaluating a request for attorneys' fees in a common fund.. Dowd v. City of L.A., Case No. See, e.g., Griffin v. Prince Edward County School Bd., 377 U. S. 218, 377 U. S. 233. to Pet. Therefore, be sure to refer to those guidelines when editing your bibliography or works cited list. The KCMSD had asked the court to order the state to advance it funds for its desegregation and operating expenses. Sixty-seventh Minnesota State Senate v. Beens, 400, 412 (WD Mo. . U.S. 248 for cases where local officers resigned. In so doing the Court emphasized that the District Court had "neither attempted to restructure local governmental entities nor to mandate a particular method or structure of state or local financing." This Court's Rule 30.2. The District Court in this case found, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, that there was no interdistrict constitutional violation that would support mandatory interdistrict relief. Missouri v. Jenkins (Jenkins II) United States Supreme Court 495 U.S. 33 (1990) Facts The Kansas City, Missouri, School District (the district) (plaintiff) and a group of students (plaintiffs) sued Missouri (defendant) in 1977 for maintaining a segregated school system in violation of Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Jenkins v. Missouri, supra, at 34-35. The court issued an order detailing a desegregation remedy and the financing necessary to implement it. Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 276 (1989) (Jenkins I). Davis v. Michigan Dept. We have long since determined that "unequal expenditures between children who happen to reside in different districts" do not violate the Equal Protection Clause. 495 U.S. 52-58. . On October 14, 1988, the Court of Appeals denied this and two. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995) MISSOURI ET AL. Richlin Security Service Co. v. Chertoff | Supreme Court Bulletin | US (abbr. The District Court rejected a request by the KCMSD to increase the property tax rate using the method endorsed by the Eighth Circuit from $4 to $4.23 per $100 of assessed valuation. Taxation by Judicial Decree - Jstor Id., at 44. But this broad suggestion does not follow from the holding in Von Hoffman. Since then, the total cost of capital improvements ordered has soared to over $540 million. U.S. 688 officials from applying state law that would interfere with the willing levy of property taxes by KCMSD," ante, at 56, n. 20, cause the KCMSD to exercise power under state law. See Cone v. West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co., Jenkins ex rel. Agyei v. Missouri, 942 F.2d 487 | Casetext Search + Citator power that is theirs to levy taxes to raise funds adequate to reopen, operate, and maintain without racial discrimination a public school system." The district court then instead named the KCMSD school district as a defendant. . 88-1150 Decided by Rehnquist Court Lower court United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Citation 495 US 33 (1990) Argued Oct 30, 1989 Decided Apr 18, 1990 O'CONNOR, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which SCALIA, J., joined, and in which REHNQUIST, C.J., joined in part, post, p. 491 U. S. 289. On October 14, 1988, the Court of Appeals denied the petitions with an order stating as follows: "There are now three petitions for rehearing en banc pending before the Court. The appellate court affirmed the order with some modifications. The case before us represents the first in which a lower federal court has in fact upheld taxation to fund a remedial decree. 1997). The Court of Appeals affirmed most of the initial order, but ordered the lower court to divide the remedy's cost equally between the entities. - Legal Principles in this Case for Law Students. Griffin endorsed the power of a federal court to order the local authority to exercise existing authority to tax. of Education v. Doyle, -721 (1883). 1983, on which respondents' complaint is based, is authority enough to require each tortfeasor to pay its share of the cost of the remedy if it can, and apportionment of the cost is part of the equitable power of the District Court. 41 ("nothing in the record to suggest" that tax limitation was intended to frustrate desegregation) with Griffin, supra, at 221 (State Constitution amended as part of state and school district plan to resist desegregation).
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